

# **Utilizing the Elements of National Power to Predict Ungoverned Space**

**A Monograph  
by  
MAJ John E. Elrich  
US Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AY 06-07**

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-05-2007			2. REPORT TYPE AMSP Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) July 2006 - May 2007	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Utilizing The Elements of National Power To Predict Ungoverned Space					5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
					5b. GRANT NUMBER	
					5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Elrich, John, E.					5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
					5e. TASK NUMBER	
					5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2134					8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 -					10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) CGSC	
					11. SPONSOR / MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT The greatest threat to stability in Africa is the increase in transnational terrorist groups and criminals that occupy the ungoverned spaces. African nations suffer from the inability of the African governments to secure their borders and protect their citizens. The situation creates problems not only for Africa but also for the remainder of the world. The way to mitigate the risk of transnational terrorists and other violent non-state actors is to take away the conditions that lead to ungoverned space. The United States must identify the African nations with the greatest potential for change. The way to identify these nations is by accessing the strength of their national powers. Enhancing the diplomatic, informational, economic, and law enforcement powers allows the nations to focus personnel and resources towards the goal of removing ungoverned space from the African continent. Once the sanctuary is removed, the transnational terrorist will be identified and eliminated. The result is a stable African continent whose nations are better established and able to connect to the remainder of the global community.						
15. SUBJECT TERMS Ungoverned Space, Elements of National Power						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 113	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, US Army	
a. REPORT U	b. ABSTRACT U	c. THIS PAGE U			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-758-3302	

# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

## **MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

MAJ John E. Elrich

Title of Monograph: Utilizing the Elements of National Power to predict  
Ungoverned Space

Approved by:

---

James J. Schneider, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

---

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

---

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,  
Graduate Degree  
Programs

## **Abstract**

UTILIZING THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO PREDICT UNGOVERNED SPACE by MAJ John E. Elrich, US Army, 106 pages.

The greatest threat to stability in Africa is the increase in transnational terrorist groups and criminals that occupy the ungoverned spaces. African nations suffer from the inability of the African governments to secure their borders and protect their citizens. The situation creates problems not only for Africa but also for the remainder of the world. The way to mitigate the risk of transnational terrorists and other violent non-state actors is to take away the conditions that lead to ungoverned space. The United States must identify the African nations with the greatest potential for change. The way to identify these nations is by assessing the strength of their national powers. Enhancing the diplomatic, informational, economic, and law enforcement powers allows the nations to focus personnel and resources towards the goal of removing ungoverned space from the African continent. Once the sanctuary is removed, the transnational terrorist will be identified and eliminated. The result is a stable African continent whose nations are better established and able to connect to the remainder of the global community.

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## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to address the problem of “ungoverned space” specified in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, by providing the government a predictive model to assist in “defusing regional conflicts” throughout the world. The United States recognizes the importance of preventing “ungoverned areas that can become havens for terrorists.”<sup>1</sup> Sanctuary denial and border interdiction are the typical means for disrupting an environment necessary for insurgents to exist.<sup>2</sup> This technique is difficult to accomplish without the assistance of the host nation and heavy reliance on the military. The model proposed in this monograph offers a multilateral approach to deny sanctuary to insurgents by leveraging all the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, economic, and law enforcement) in a concerted effort to achieve the goals of the *National Security Strategy*. The argument is that this model will produce the greatest success with the lowest cost in personnel and resources to the United States government. This model permits the United States government to influence another nation with all the elements of national power, not just the military, to meet the current threats to the United States. This military centric policy is already

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<sup>1</sup>The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office March 2006), 20, Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 10 September 2006.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph D. Celeski, “Attacking Insurgents Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction,” *Military Review* (November-December 2006): 51-57.

evident in the number of forces deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11) to deter aggression or assist in nation building.<sup>3</sup>

The threat to the United States is not standing armies of the Cold War era but of terrorist organizations that combat the United States military as discussed in Taber's, *The War of the Flea*. The terrorists represent the fleas to the US' dog. The United States has difficulty defeating the terrorists because there is too much territory to defend and the flea is far too agile an enemy for the United States to defeat.<sup>4</sup> Similar to fleas, these terrorist organizations are growing in the regions of the world that are ungoverned and in countries that lack metaphysically the means to prevent their development. The greatest menaces to the United States currently are the competing governments and institutions that support the terrorists. A suitable model can reduce the amount of terrain by providing a list of the countries affording the best conditions for terrorists to operate. Barnett creates two areas of the world in his book, *The Pentagon's New Map*; these are the "Functioning Core" and the "Non-integrating Gap."<sup>5</sup> The Functioning Core represents the established nations in the world that in general interact within the bounds of international law. Non-integrating Gap are the nations trying to survive the age of global economies and unable to interact with Functioning Core nations via international law.<sup>6</sup> The United States cannot effectively police the entire region of the Non-integrating Gap. When Barnett presented his

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<sup>3</sup>Globalsecurity.org, Where are the Legions? [SPQR] Global Deployments of US Forces, Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm>; Internet; accessed on 15 December 2006.

<sup>4</sup>Robert Taber, *The War of the Flea* (New York, NY: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), 27-28.

<sup>5</sup>Thomas, P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 50.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 125-137.

picture of the Non-integrating Gap, the key concern to Pentagon officials was how to shrink the gap.<sup>7</sup> This model provides a means for the United States to narrow the area of the Non-integrating Gap and determine which countries will benefit most from United States intervention. It provides a rank order for countries in terms of national power in order to ascertain the most effective way to identify the dynamics of the gap and close it. Most importantly, it targets the areas providing the terrorists a suitable launching pad for terror against the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The expected outcome of this model is an established database maintained by both the Department of Defense and the Department of State containing, at a minimum, an accurate reflection of conditions in countries comprising the Non-integrating Gap. This model provides the United States National Command Authority an early warning tool that formulates the strength of each nation in a region by assessing the various categories of their national power. This information allows commanders to make educated decisions on the utilization of the elements of national power within their operational environments to resolve ungoverned space. In accurately targeting the countries with the greatest potential for ungoverned space in the world, Commanders can utilize the information provided by this model to develop courses of action mitigating the conditions that may lead to the threat conditions that may develop in ungoverned space. The most important factor of the model is that it is preventive in nature, enabling the Combatant Commander to focus limited resources. It enables leaders to determine the countries that currently have the greatest potential for change. Targeting the nations that have the least

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 154-5.

<sup>8</sup>The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

problems will help the region overall by adding stability to the region at the least cost in resources to the United States. This ink spot approach will decrease the amount of ungoverned space and facilitate a multinational approach to the nations with greater problems in controlling their territory. The military and the State Department can work in unison to develop these courses of action in order to capitalize on all the elements of national power and the synergistic effects resulting from a unified plan. The model provides a framework for the military and the State Department representatives to work in a unified fashion developing integrated objectives for assisting a country to prevent ungoverned space. This unity of effort increases the effectiveness of the United States actions by ensuring deliberate effort utilizing all elements of its national power and tracking the success of their actions by assessing the changes in a target country's level of national power.

## **Determining Ungoverned Space**

In order to understand the problem of ungoverned space, there must be a clear definition. Currently there are several definitions for ungoverned space. The RAND Corporation defines ungoverned space as “the territory of failed and failing states and areas within otherwise minimally functioning states where governance is absent.”<sup>9</sup> Rotberg’s defines the requirements of a state as “to provide that political good of security--to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national

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<sup>9</sup>RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, *Dealing with Failed States and Ungoverned Space* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005), Available from <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp.html>; Internet; accessed 10 September 2006.

order an social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.”<sup>10</sup> Lastly, the United States Defense Strategy loosely defines ungoverned space as “The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unstable, and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.”<sup>11</sup> For the purpose of the monograph, the definition of ungoverned space is the area within a state where the state does not provide the basic requirements of security, the rule of law, and stability for its citizens with the understanding that the areas create sanctuaries for terrorists and others.<sup>12</sup> The key factors being the lack of security and governance within the region creating the conditions for a sanctuary for terrorists.

Ungoverned space by definition does not provide security to the inhabitants of the region. Humans, according to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, view safety as the number two priority; obviously, the people in the region of ungoverned space will seek security from whoever will provide it. If the nation’s government fails to provide the security, then the population will follow any organization that provides them security, regardless of political or religious background. Griffith contributes this situation as the nexus for why people decide to participate in

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<sup>10</sup>Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair” in *When States Fail Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>11</sup>Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 March 2005), 3.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 3-6.

insurgencies. “What have we to lose; if we barely have the means to exist.”<sup>13</sup> This type of environment is increasing throughout Non-integrating Gap but particularly in the African nations. For this reason, the focus of the dataset for the monograph is on African nations.

Sudan is an excellent example of a nation that fails to provide security and protect the rights of a large majority of its citizens. Historically, the ineptness of the Sudanese government has created a haven for terrorists and criminals. Sudan, over the last two decades, demonstrated an inability to govern its borders and provide basic services to its citizens. The most egregious incident has been the Sudanese government ignoring Osama bin Laden’s support of Egyptian Jihadists and the movement of Majahidin from Pakistan to the Sudan.<sup>14</sup> The Sudanese government, from 1991 to 1996, allowed Osama bin Laden free reign to organize and expand his terrorist activities.<sup>15</sup> Only after severe diplomatic and economic sanctions did the Sudanese government finally expel Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden’s financial investments and bribes to government officials created the conditions for ungoverned space. These conditions provided Bin Laden the time to recruit and train new members for the Jihad in preparation for the attacks on the United States Embassies in 1998 and the *USS Cole* in 2000. This represents the danger created by ungoverned space when government leaders allow criminals and terrorist organizations to operate within their borders for personal financial gain.

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<sup>13</sup>Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 6.

<sup>14</sup>Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror Radical Islam’s War Against America* (New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperback, 2003), 234.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 234-247.

The current situation in Sudan's Darfur region provides another example of how a nation creates ungoverned space by failing to provide security to select ethnic groups. The Sudanese government's militia, the Janjaweed, are attacking and killing the citizens of Darfur without any preventative action from the Sudanese military. The Sudanese government does not view the area as a problem and will not allow international peacekeepers to enter the region to protect the citizens of Darfur by claiming international sovereignty for the region. This example of ungoverned space is the most difficult area for the international community to intervene in due to the current international law's inability to enforce a specific government to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The leaders of the Sudanese government standby with no apparent involvement as these atrocities occur daily.<sup>16</sup> The government troops focus their efforts on protecting the oil resources and murdering the nomadic tribes in the Darfur region.<sup>17</sup> This crisis is mainly a result of the instability in the government and the distrust that resulted from years of civil war between the North and the South of Sudan leaving the country as a "failed state."<sup>18</sup>

The governance of a country is the key factor to ungoverned space. The most likely locations for ungoverned space are in weak or failing states. These governments do not have the capabilities or the will to impose sovereignty over their territories. North Korea is considered a

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<sup>16</sup>Darfur Action Committee, "Darfur Panel Illustrates Region's Suffering," Available from <http://www.international.ucla.edu/darfur/article.asp?parentid=54714>; Internet; accessed on 20 December 2006.

<sup>17</sup>Emily Wax, "Sudanese Troops Attack and Destroy Camp in Darfur Refugees Fear Relocation Campaign," *Washington Post*, 3 November 2004, Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23520-2004Nov3.html>; Internet; accessed on 10 December 2006.

<sup>18</sup>Fund for Peace, "The Failed State Index," Available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php>; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2006.

failed state by the Fund for Peace based on being the fourteenth worst nation according to the 2006 Failed State Index;<sup>19</sup> however, most people would consider it impossible for North Korea to have ungoverned space. The government of the country does not necessarily provide for its citizens but it would not allow criminals or insurgents to operate within North Korean borders. Pakistan, ranked ninth on the 2006 Failed State Index,<sup>20</sup> allows terrorists and drug smugglers unhindered movement in Waziristan and the federally administered tribal areas, along the border with Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup> The Pakistani government makes an effort to demonstrate governance and control over the region to the world, but realizes the difficulty of true regional control due to the strong ethnic, tribal, and religious ties to the terrorists operating in the area. The Pakistani government cannot provide security to all its citizens since it lacks the national will to deny terrorist sanctuary in the border regions.

The sentiments and historical background of a country is another reason for ungoverned space in failed states. The majority of the nations of Africa originated from the collapse of the colonial system. The colonial system did not consider tribal and cultural borders when creating the new countries. The colonial governments merely created countries based on lines of longitude and latitude. This forced several warring tribes into one country creating resentment and distrust in the colonial appointed governments. These tribes continue to fight today over resources creating instability in the government and ungoverned space throughout the countryside.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Stuart Eiznestat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January-February 2005): 134.

The United States military must identify the growing importance of ungoverned space because of its implications for the future. The enemy of the future is not as easy to define as enemies of the past, the Cold War provided a greater amount of stability because of a known threat.<sup>22</sup> Barnett describes the threat not as individuals but a condition of “disconnectedness.”<sup>23</sup> The majority of the people in the gap want to reach out to connect with the people of the function core.<sup>24</sup> It is necessary for the United States to define and reduce global ungoverned space in order to deny terrorists the ability to prevent the movement of people from the gap to the core. The United States military can use this model to replicate the oil-spot counter insurgency theory by creating areas of governance. This increase in governmental control will increase the opportunity for citizens to provide security and financial support for their families.

## **Problem**

The problem currently facing the United States government is determining the countries that provide locations predisposed for future terrorist activity. The United States is presently involved in a two-theater conflict that is exhausting the military power and straining the financial stability of the United States. If the United States can better predict the future locations of terrorist networks, with a high level of probability, it will be able to maximize its resources to support the current troubled government and prevent future conflicts.<sup>25</sup> The costs associated with

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<sup>22</sup>Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map* (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 22.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, *Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case Against a Standing Nation-Building Office* (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2006), 3-32.

nation building are high but not as costly as the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in terms of dollars, military personnel, and political capital.<sup>26</sup> A predictive tool to target ungoverned space provides a benefit for the United States because it is far more costly to deploy military forces than to aid a foreign government via the other elements of national power.<sup>27</sup> This will enable the United States to maintain the best-trained military and conduct nation building under a multinational banner of the United Nations.

## **Limitations and Scope**

It is important to understand that there are limitations for the research on ungoverned space. Ungoverned space is difficult to determine based on the ability of a country to provide basic security for its citizens. The general expectations of governments are that they take every effort to secure their borders from insurgency, terrorism, and criminal activity. Some countries are able to prevent terrorism within their borders but choose not to for political reasons; examples are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia where the reigning governments depend on the Muslim majority to retain power. The purpose of the research is not to target countries with internationally established political regimes that the United States cannot change via the elements of national power, for example North Korea, Iran, and Cuba. The ability to influence established countries is a task that must remain with the United Nations such as with the case of Iran continuing to develop their nuclear arms program. The focus of the research is on smaller and less established countries in the international community that can benefit and improve their conditions with

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

support from the United States and the United Nations. The recent actions in Lebanon demonstrate the difficulties for a struggling government to control its territory when other nations are able to influence and support radical groups within its borders. Iran's recent involvement in supporting Hezbollah in the war against Israel is an example of this type of divisive support. The lack of international resolve on the part of the United Nations creates a bad precedent for future incursions into fragile nation states.

In proposing this research question, the experiment must look at two key aspects that create the conditions for ungoverned space. What is the level of governance or rather the lack of governance within the countries? Secondly, do the conditions in the country provide the necessary requirements for the terrorist network to be successful? The results of the two questions determine which countries have the greatest potential to create the conditions for Mao's "Phase I (organization, consolidation, and preservation) and Phase II (progressive expansion)." <sup>28</sup> The understanding of these conditions and the relevance for creating the conditions for ungoverned space provides the United States government with an instrument to determine objectives that produce the desired effects.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The goal of this research is to find a correlation between deficiencies in specific elements of national power that create the conditions for ungoverned space. This is determined by

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<sup>28</sup>Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1961), 21.

measuring the national power of a country (diplomatic, information, military, economic, and law enforcement). The elements of national power depict the ability of a country to govern itself and interact in the global community. These powers vary in capacity from country to country. It is generally understood that countries which possess higher rankings in terms of national power are relatively strong players within the global community. The Group of Eight, which consists of the eight economically strongest nations in the world, represents almost 65 percent of the global economy. These nations are a good example of countries that utilize the elements of national power to maintain influence over their territories and citizens in order to prevent terrorist activities.

The model incorporates the variables listed in subsequent paragraphs to determine if a country possesses the conditions to create ungoverned space. Data collected from all of the nations in the world proved to diverse due to the disparity between first world and third world nations. The powerful nations are removed from the datasets avoid the influence of being significant outliers in the experiment (USA, UK, Germany, and others). These nations maintain established governments and are members of strong international organizations like NATO, which make every effort to prevent ungoverned space. To limit the scope of the experiment the focus of the monograph is on the African nations since Africa is the most troubled region in the world, in relation to ungoverned space.

## Diplomatic Power

The first element of national power is diplomatic power. Diplomatic power refers to the ability of a nation state to utilize diplomacy to interact with other nations via international organizations, treaties, agreements, and law. Zhu Majie describes it as a country's ability to contribute positively to international affairs and society while maintaining a coercive capacity in administration of its foreign affairs.<sup>29</sup> It provides a nation state the legal basis to exist in the international community since it provides the state the ability to create treaties and implement contracts. These diplomatic tools enable a nation state to engage in business and trade with other countries allowing them the ability to provide opportunities for its citizens in the global market.<sup>30</sup> The diplomatic power of a nation state ensures it the greatest opportunity to interact with international organizations that are vital to the economic success of the nation states' citizens. The European Union is an excellent example of diplomatic status enhancing the nation's economic status.

In diplomatic power, the experiment is looking at the ability of a state to function globally. The lower the power of diplomacy in any given country correlates to a higher susceptibility for the creation of ungoverned space. This is primarily due to the inability of a government to work with the international community for the interdiction and apprehension of

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<sup>29</sup>Zhu Majie, "Role of Soft Power in International Relations," Paper presented at the seminar on Cultural Factors in International Relations, Sponsored by Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 5-6 December 2002, Available from <http://www.siis.org.cn/english/journal/en20031-2/zhumajie.htm>; Internet; accessed on 20 December 2006.

<sup>30</sup>Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, "Failed States, or the State as Failure?" *The University of Chicago Law Review* 72 (2005): 1159-1195.

terrorists, insurgents, or criminal organizations. If a country maintains a high level of participation in international organizations, the less likely the country will be unstable. The Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative is a good example of how diplomatic power can create conditions in the international community to gain resources and equipment to strengthen the security of a nation.<sup>31</sup> The Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative is an agreement between the United States, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria. In the agreement, the United States agrees to provide training to assist partner nation's militaries in combating terrorism, thereby, enhancing regional security and stability.<sup>32</sup>

The number of embassies and consulates abroad is a primary metric utilized to measure the level of diplomatic power. A greater number of embassies and consulates correlate to a greater ability of a country to influence other nations via diplomacy. If a nation has a large number of embassies, it should have significant diplomatic power. Switzerland is able to maintain 301 embassies and consulates throughout the world. The country is renowned for its established record of diplomacy and ability to represent a neutral view in world opinion. The ability of such a small state to affect so many other states is clearly a result of its value in sustained diplomatic

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<sup>31</sup>Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service, "New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa," Available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2005/May/19-888364.html>; Internet; accessed on 24 October 2006.

<sup>32</sup>Global Security.org, Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCIT), Available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm>; Internet; accessed on 25 October 2006.

power.<sup>33</sup> Israel maintains 96 embassies abroad, demonstrating the importance of diplomatic power for assisting a nation in stability, both politically and economically.<sup>34</sup>

The second metric used to measure of diplomatic power is the number of memberships in international organizations. Kaplan warns, “The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden, coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.”<sup>35</sup> The cost of maintaining embassies and consulates is high with some smaller nations having only limited representation throughout the world. It is important to understand the value of membership of international organizations. These diplomatic ties facilitate the success of a nation state in the international economy. It is important to understand that it is far easier for countries to maintain membership in international organizations than to maintain embassies or consulates. Countries that maintain a greater level of membership in international organizations will be able to benefit their citizens with both economic advantages through cooperation in the global environment and increased security through security cooperation with more powerful nations.

## **Information Power**

The second element of national power is information. It is important to understand that the old adage “information is power” is even more true for the nations located in the Non-

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel’s Diplomatic Missions Abroad: Status of Relations,” 12 July 2006, Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Diplomatic+missions/Israel-s+Diplomatic+Missions+Abroad.htm>; Internet; accessed on 20 October 2006.

<sup>35</sup>Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), 58.

integrating Gap. The differences in capabilities are dramatic compared to those of the Functioning Core. Nations can control the ways in which their citizens receive information. The amount of control varies on the spectrum from the United States, which allows essentially free transfer of information between its citizens access to government agencies, to China, which restricts the majority of information to its citizens. This flow of information is available in several different mediums at both the national and global level. The most common means for the population to gain information is via the internet, television stations, radio stations, and newspapers. The more traditional methods for information are newspaper circulation and radio stations. The experiment assumes that the greater the number of radio stations and newspapers available the better the ability of the average citizen to receive a variety of information sources regarding local, regional, and world issues. Countries with only a few government-run newspapers and radio stations would limit the amount of information available to the public. This increases the chances of ungoverned space by creating an environment where citizens do not know or understand the ramifications for assisting terrorists or criminals. A country with a large system of information networks to its citizens creates conditions for an increase in informational power at the global level. A country that maintains high levels of radio and television stations and a large number of newspapers provides its citizens with an adequate amount of information to interact in the global society.

The fastest increasing means of information is via the internet. The number of internet users is increasing at an exponential rate throughout the world. The internet provides the opportunity for people to communicate from anywhere in the world regardless of background. The experiment assumes that the greater the number of IP addresses in the country the greater chance of its citizens to receive information from a variety of sources. The greater the number of IP addresses correlates to the capability of information flow across the internet. Data was gathered using the number of IP addresses per country as a measurement of a citizen's access to the internet for information on the world. The number of IP address in a country should correlate to the number of computer users in the nation. The greater the number of IP address and computer

users facilitates an increase in information flow into a country. It is important to understand that the larger the number of IP addresses also provides a venue for terrorists to spread their campaign message without fear of reprisal. The common method of communication among individuals in terrorist groups is via the internet since tracking messages is difficult and often not timely enough to apprehend the offender. Combined, these measurements provide us with the ability of a nation to inform its citizens regarding both local and world events. A limitation to the internet is the inherent problem with authenticity of items posted on various websites. Terrorists to espouse their perceptions and persuade the uninformed, allowing fiction to become facts often use the internet. The use of Al Qaeda websites to stir aggression towards the United States with falsified documents or pictures is good example of these tactics.

The belief is that a stable nation provides unlimited access to information while a failed state limits access to information. The established nations of the world provide information to their citizens via several means of communication but more importantly provides their citizens with relative freedom of speech and ability to acquire information. A nation that deprives its citizens from information creates the conditions that lead to ungoverned space due to the distrust of the citizens for the government. A lack of media channels creates a permissive environment for terrorists. It must be understood that the internet provides a means of communication for terrorists so all aspects of information must be incorporated in the experiment to determine the affects of information on ungoverned space.

The experiment incorporates the number of radio stations (AM, FM, and Shortwave), the number of newspapers (average number of copies sold directly, by subscription, or distributed free both in the country and abroad), the number of television stations, and the number of telephones (hard line or cellular) to determine a strength of a country in the category of information. The experiment assumes that a country with a large number of means of information flow will be less likely to produce ungoverned space.

## **Military Power**

The third element of national power is military. Military power is difficult to measure since it is truly dependent on the military force's level of training and equipment. The experiment defines the measurement of military power as the size of the military force in a country. The size of militia forces is incorporated in the total number of military forces in order to gain an understanding of the relative ability of a country to defend its borders. The government is able to control the area within its borders proportionally to the size of the military. The greater the size of the military in comparison to the population or area, the greater sphere of control the government has over the country. This is a vital necessity for a country to defend itself but more importantly in maintaining an internal defense against terrorists and criminals. Countries with minimal internal defenses are highly susceptible to terrorists or criminals.<sup>36</sup> Rotberg contends that the most critical requirement of a nation is to provide security to its citizens.<sup>37</sup> This security can only be provided through a strong military and law enforcement presence. It is the most essential requirement for a nation to prevent ungoverned space and the development of terrorist networks.

The measurement of military power is a difficult task to accomplish since the size of the military must be proportionate to the size of the country and the population. The larger the country, the greater the size of the military required for ensuring the security of the country. It is important to understand the size of the military is a factor in the experiment since the majority of the countries in Africa are surrounded on three to four sides by rival nations and must maintain

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<sup>36</sup>Robert I. Rotberg, "Future Regional Crises: Failing States," Paper presented at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 11 April 2004.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

large forces to defend borders from external and internal threats. The smaller nations require a robust military in order to compete with the challenges of neighboring countries and terrorist organizations. If a country were unable to send forces to the rural regions of its territory, it would create conditions for ungoverned space. The size or world ranking of an army is important when discussing second and third world nations since the military must be large enough and sufficiently competent to fight conventional wars and insurgencies. The experiment uses the size of the military in comparison to the size of the country and the population. The country that provides the least amount of forces for square mile increases the chances for ungoverned space.

The measurement of how much money a nation spends on its military provides information on its ability to fund the resources for protecting its citizens. If the nation spends more than the world average of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on the military then it should be able to protect its borders. A problem arises when the nation spends more money on the military and not enough on the basic needs of its citizens. Eritrea is an example of a country that out spends the world in percentage of GDP on the military, but at the loss of important services to its citizens. The experiment uses the amount of money spent in millions of dollars on the military and the percentage of military spending compared to the gross domestic production of a specific country. In comparing these numbers to the world average, a country that deviates significantly from the average creates conditions for terrorists by either not providing basic services or security due to failure to manage fiscal responsibility.

## **Economic Power**

The fourth element of national power is economic power. This is the capability of a country to operate in the global economy. If a country is economically strong, it provides its citizens the opportunity to pursue gainful employment and inhibits the chance for terrorist organizations to recruit supporters. If a country is weak in economic status, it provides the motivation required by terrorists to coerce the local populous to support their objectives. A

country relatively weak economically cannot waste the financial resources to combat the terrorist presence. This weak economy leads to the creation of ungoverned space due to the desire of the populous to support the terrorists for financial gains.

The key indicators for economic power are gross national product, purchasing power parity (PPP), and unemployment percentage.<sup>38</sup> The higher the PPP results in a more stable economy with less chance of moving into a failed state status. The GDP determines the total value of goods and services produced in the country minus the cost of the goods and services.<sup>39</sup> The GDP is significant in predicting a countries' decline into a failed state.<sup>40</sup> This is important in determining if the government is sufficiently resourced to combat a costly internal domestic program such as counterterrorism. It is important to note that countries with even a higher than normal GDP are still affected by governments that enrich themselves with excess cash instead of supporting internal reforms.<sup>41</sup> The GDP per capita provides a general idea to the amount of money added to the country's economy because of producing goods and services.<sup>42</sup> The GDP measurement is in millions of United States dollars for the experiment.

## **Law Enforcement Power**

The remaining element of national power is law enforcement. Law enforcement is not an element of the traditional version of national power. The increase in interagency operations with

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>United Nations, *United Nations Cyber School Bus*, Available from <http://www.un.org/Pubs/CyberSchoolBus/infonation3/menu/advanced.asp>; Internet; accessed on 20 August 2006.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

the military dramatically enhances the role of law enforcement in the persecution of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Law enforcement officers are training Host Nation police in modern tactics to assist in tracking down terrorists. Law enforcement forces are vital to ensure this security at the local and regional level.<sup>43</sup> The ability of a country to maintain a large police force with integrity and respect for the law is an essential requirement to avoid ungoverned space. Population shifts from the countryside to the city due to increase in urbanization and industrial job growth increases the importance of law enforcement in the rural community. The presence of a border patrol ensures control of the major lines of communication to prevent movement of illegal materials for use by the terrorists. The border patrol maintains connections with the neighboring countries to ensure unity of effort to control the border for the benefit of both countries since insurgents in country X could be using country Y for rest and recuperation.

An honest police is vital for success in counterterrorist operations. Countries that do not have an honorable police force are providing an atmosphere where crime exists by both the citizens and the government. This situation leads to a further separation of trust between the citizens and the government since the government and the terrorists persecute the citizens. This situation creates the most opportunistic conditions for the terrorists to achieve successful operations since at least the terrorist will provide some form of security. Once the terrorists accomplish security for the citizens, they will be able to operate freely within the ungoverned space. This freedom of operation will ensure that government officials do not make any efforts to enter the terrorist sanctuaries for fear of repercussions, similar to the situation in Colombia with

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<sup>43</sup>Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” 1.

FARC controlled territories. The measurement of law enforcement is the size of the police force in relation to the size of the population. The greater the ratio of police officers to citizens should result in a decrease in the conditions for ungoverned space.

## **RESULTS**

The original data set consisted of every nation in the world but was too diverse to find the differences in the smaller nations. The dramatic differences between the smaller nations of the world and the superpowers required the experiment to reduce the number of subjects in the experiment. The difficulty was in determining the countries that have the highest probability of becoming failed states, due to the large amount of outliers in the experiment. The experiment reduced the data set for only African nations; this resulted in the creation of further outliers resulting in the removal of some of the stronger African nations such as South Africa, Algeria, and Libya. An analysis was conducted on all the dimensions of national power, and the results are presented in Appendix A. The data needed some refinement of the results of the experiment since the majority of the nations were clustered, and it was difficult to determine which were the most likely to produce the conditions for ungoverned space. The graphs were scaled so as to not include the outliers in order to conduct a more in-depth analysis of characteristics that lead to failure and ungoverned space. It is important for the purpose of the experiment to determine the contributing factors in the elements of national power that lead to the creation of ungoverned

space. The results depict the strength in each element of national power to determine each country's individual strength within that element.

## **Diplomacy**

If Rose's hypothesis is correct, correlating the effect of embassies on foreign trade for a country and a similar correlation should exist with PPP with embassies.<sup>44</sup> The data displays a strong significance for strength of PPP when paired with the number of embassies and/or consulates and membership in international organizations. Table 2, Appendix B, depicts the significance of the T-Test pairing of Embassies to PPP and Membership to PPP (.008 and .001 respectively). A country that scores above the mean in figure 1 is strong in diplomacy as well as for economic strength.

Appendix A, Figure 1 depicts the results of the comparison of embassies to population size. Embassies and Consulates are combined and located on the Y-axis. The population is located on the X-axis. The line on the chart represents the linear regression of the variables. It can be assumed that the countries that are located above the line maintain a sufficient number of embassies and consulates in comparison to the size of the population. Countries that are located below the line have greater disadvantage in their ability to interact diplomatically in the world. It is important to note the major disadvantages to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with minimal representation for such a large population. The countries clustered along the left of the

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<sup>44</sup> Andrew Rose, Faculty, *The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade: Embassies as Export Promotion* (Berkeley, CA: Haas School of Business, 2005), Available from <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rose/Bureauc.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 12 August 2006.

X-axis have the least exchange of diplomacy and are weak economically from the lack of diplomatic power to induce trade. The significance of this is that failed states lack the resources to maintain embassies abroad and lack the ability to project diplomatic power in transnational organizations. This ability to become a failed state leads to the creation of ungoverned space since the lack of diplomatic power creates some of the required conditions. The countries in the center of the cluster are the following nations: Somalia, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Zambia. These represent struggling nations that have suffered from their lack of diplomatic power to assist their nations from the civil wars or ethnic cleansing that occurred since the end of the Cold War.

Appendix A, Figure 2 represents a more in depth view of the countries with the removal of the outliers. It is important to note the countries that are located on or just below the line. These countries have the greatest potential for changing their diplomatic status by assisting them to increase their representation via embassies or consulates in the world. Since the correlation of embassies to PPP is .405 with a significance of .008, by increasing the number of embassies in Kenya, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic for example should assist them achieving sufficient representation for their population size.

Appendix A, Figure 3 demonstrates the comparison of international organization membership to population size. The number of international memberships is located on the Y-axis. The population is located on the X-axis. The line on the chart represents the linear regression of the variables. It is important to note the disparity in international representation among the countries similar in population size. This creates a significant problem for the nations located below the line to be gain assistance from the international community.

Appendix A, Figure 4 removes the outliers and focuses on the nations that have the greatest potential for assistance. The countries located just below the line can greatly benefit from assistance in gaining representation in international organizations to assist their diplomatic power.

## Information

Appendix B, Table 4 displays the result of the Paired T Test for the various means of information networks for a country. The most significant forms of information flow are telephone systems and radio stations. The least significant are television stations and internet hosts. These results illustrate the importance of the United States to assist countries to expand their telephone and radio capabilities. Despite the low significance of television and internet hosts, it is important to understand that these results will continue to change in the future due to the expansion of internet throughout the region.

Appendix A, Figure 5 represents the comparison of landline telephones to the population. It is important to note the severe deficiency in several countries to maintain the mean expected for a country in comparison to the population. The lack of telephone lines demonstrates the inability of the government to resource the rural region of the country leading to the creation of ungoverned space.

Appendix A, Figure 6 highlights the countries that suffer the most from the lack of telephone infrastructure. The countries that are located in the lower left quadrant of the figure are primarily failed states that are unable to spend funds towards enhancing telephone infrastructure. The countries located along the mean are the easiest to enhance telephone communications capabilities.

Appendix A, Figure 7 depicts the comparison of cell phone users to the population of the country. Cells phones are increasing at an exponential rate due to a weak infrastructure of hard wire telephones in the African nations. Countries that lie below the line are not maintaining the level of information flow expected for population size.

Appendix A, Figure 8 depicts the countries that could benefit the most from an increase in the number of cell towers and cell phone providers to enhance the level of information flow for countries along the line.

Appendix A, Figure 9 displays the strength of the relationship between the number of AM radio stations in comparison to the population of the country.

Appendix A, Figure 10 depicts the countries that can benefit most from an increase in the number of AM radio stations to increase the information capacity of countries in Africa.

Appendix A, Figure 11 demonstrates the lack of FM radio stations throughout the African region.

Appendix A, Figure 12 demonstrates the weakness of the several countries in the ability to transmit information via FM radio. The countries with the least population are the easiest to target for increasing potential. The contrast of the efforts of the Mali government to maintain information flow compared to the Sudanese government that wishes to decrease the flow.

Appendix A, Figures 13 and 14 display the lack of short wave radio capability in the African region. The linear regression displays the small requirement in radio stations to increase the capability of a country in the region to provide information via shortwave radio.

Appendix A, Figure 15 displays the disparity of television stations throughout the African region. Ethiopia is the greatest outlier with very limited flow of information by television in Africa when compared to population size.

Appendix A, Figure 16 highlights the countries that have the greatest potential for change based on number of television stations and size of population. The difference of one or two television stations can move four countries above the mean for information flow.

Appendix A, Figure 17 depicts the dramatic weakness of the majority of countries in Africa lacking in the number of internet hosts in relations to the size of the population.

Appendix A, Figure 18 highlights the countries that are the most disconnected from the current informational highway.

## **Military**

The results of the paired T-Tests, Appendix B, Table 6, displayed a high level of significance of the size of the military to the population and the area of a country. The size of the military in relation to the amount of spending on the military as a percentage of the GDP displayed a high significance with a high level of correlation. The major outliers in this experiment were Yemen and Eritrea. Eritrea spends 19.4 percent of its GDP on the military. Normally a higher percentage of military spending should result in a more secure nation. Eritrea is the opposite of that hypothesis because the military spending is so disproportional to the remainder of the world that it should lead instability in the government due to the fact that the citizens are not being provided basic services since the military budget is so large for such a small country. The countries that vary at least one standard deviation from the mean would have an increased chance of becoming a failed state. This would create the conditions for ungoverned space due to the inability to control borders.

Appendix A, Figure 19 depicts the size of the military in comparison to the size of the population. The countries below the linear regression represent countries at the greatest risk for ungoverned space due to the inability to have a sufficient presence compared to population size.

Appendix A, Figure 20 displays the comparison of the percentage of the Gross National Product spent on the military based on the size of the population. The countries that lie below the linear regression spend considerably less of their GDP in comparison to other countries within the region

Appendix A, Figure 21 demonstrates the comparison of the area of a country in comparison to the size of the military. In looking for the creation of ungoverned space, any country that lies below the linear regression has the greatest potential for the creation of ungoverned space since the area is far too large for the size of the military.

Appendix A, Figure 22 illustrates the differences in the amount of spending on militaries based on the percentage of the GDP. The countries that fall below the linear regression are not spending sufficient resources in order to prevent ungoverned space.

## **Economics**

The most important indicator for a country's success in the economic power is the PPP and human capital. Appendix B, Table 8 represents the results of comparing GDP, GDP per capita, and PPP. Countries that rank high in these categories have a better chance to avoid failed state conditions creating ungoverned space due to a country's inability to resource the government to provide the basic services to prevent insurgency or terrorists. Most of the countries listed below are ranked very low in the world on PPP. This makes it very difficult for the nations, like Eritrea, to compete in the global economy. Figure 11 demonstrates the regression of GDP, GDP per capita, PPP, and human capital to determine the true value of a country's economy. The additional variable of human capital determines the ability of the population to assist the country in the creation of a better economy by providing the intelligence and skill labor.

Appendix A, Figure 23 shows the effect of human capital on the size of the GDP of a nation. Countries that do not invest in the education of their citizens remain below the linear regression and are unable to increase their GDP due to lack of education.

Appendix A, Figure 24 illustrates the effect of the literacy rate on a country's GDP. The graph demonstrates that an increase literacy rate results in an increase in GDP.

## **Law Enforcement**

Law enforcement levels were difficult to determine for the African region. In the databases, available only fourteen countries listed the size of their law enforcement agencies. The majority of the countries in Africa utilize the military to perform the duties expected from the police. Despite the size of the pool, it is important to note the significance of the size of the police

force in comparison to the size of the population. Appendix B, Table 10 displays the Paired T-Test results.

Appendix A, Figure 25 represents the comparison of the size of the population to the size of the police force. Countries below the linear regression are not able to maintain significant police presences within the country.

Appendix A, Figure 26 illustrates the comparison of the area of a country to the size of the police force. The larger the country requires an increase in the size of the police force. Countries that are large in area but do not resource a sufficient size police force create conditions for ungoverned space.

## **Summary**

Table 1 represents the comparison of all the countries in the experiment by rank ordering each country in the respective level of national power. The country with the highest level of diplomacy would receive a 1 and the country with the worst level receives a 44. The average score for each element of national power creates the total combined national power index. The greater the score, the least amount of national power available to the country. The Failed State Index rating is in the last column in order to compare the results to an independent research that is not reliant on the same statistics for the results.

Table 1. African Countries rank ordered from weakest to strongest in National Power

Country	Diplomacy	Information	Military	Economic	Law Enforcement	Total National Power	Failed States Index
Swaziland	41	31	17	38	44	34.2	
Central African Repu	34	42	42	23	26	33.4	13
Niger	21	27	41	22	43	30.8	44
Sierra Leone	36	38	22	36	22	30.8	17
Comoros	40	44	20	12	37	30.6	
Guinea	29	33	26	39	25	30.4	11
Somalia	42	20	44	31	15	30.4	7
Equatorial Guinea	43	39	15	16	38	30.2	52
Guinea-Bissau	33	41	8	28	40	30	46
Maldives	44	34	5	42	16	28.2	
Gambia, The	19	30	30	18	39	27.2	83
Malawi	13	22	40	20	41	27.2	29
Senegal	15	26	28	44	18	26.2	99
Benin	16	25	36	15	35	25.4	90
Tanzania	23	8	33	32	31	25.4	71
Mozambique	26	10	38	9	42	25	80
Mali	22	15	35	43	9	24.8	81
Zambia	25	12	21	41	24	24.6	66
Congo, Democratic Re	28	4	25	24	33	22.8	2
Rwanda	37	28	4	40	5	22.8	24
Burundi	35	35	6	26	11	22.6	15
Madagascar	24	21	31	27	10	22.6	
Djibouti	31	43	2	35	1	22.4	
Kenya	11	2	32	37	30	22.4	34
Cape Verde	9	37	13	10	36	21	
Lesotho	39	29	27	5	4	20.8	
Sudan	17	5	18	29	34	20.6	1
Liberia	38	36	11	11	6	20.4	12
Chad	20	32	12	8	28	20	6
Togo	14	24	24	25	13	20	38
Congo, Republic of t	32	23	16	4	23	19.6	
Cote d'Ivoire	18	6	39	21	12	19.2	3
Namibia	12	19	9	33	17	18	91
Mauritania	30	16	7	34	2	17.8	41
Zimbabwe	27	13	14	1	29	16.8	5
Cameroon	7	7	29	17	21	16.2	36
Burkina Faso	6	18	34	6	14	15.6	30
Eritrea	10	40	1	7	20	15.6	54
Ethiopia	5	14	19	13	27	15.6	26
Nigeria	2	1	37	30	7	15.4	22
Uganda	8	9	23	2	32	14.8	21
Ghana	1	3	43	14	8	13.8	106
Gabon	4	17	10	19	3	10.6	84
Angola	3	11	3	3	19	7.8	37

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

The Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2006" Washington D.C. (May/June 2006)

available at <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php> accessed 15 December 2006

## ANALYSIS

The model demonstrates the elements of national power influencing the ability of a country to prevent ungoverned space. The model illustrates that changing some of the metrics in

one of the categories of national power can have a cumulative effect on the overall strength of a country. A country's population size is the link to the majority of the metrics highlighting the importance of a country to maintain a minimum level of national power based on population size in order to remain competitive in the global environment.

The most significant finding is the correlation between the "ungoverned space" model to that of the Fund for Peace model. The Fund for Peace model is used to determine if a country has the potential to become a failed state. The Fund for Peace utilizes the following twelve factors to determine a nation's chance for to become a failed state:

Social Indicators:

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex

Humanitarian Emergencies

3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

Economic Indicators:

1. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
2. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline

Political Indicators:

1. Criminalization and or Delegitimization of the State
2. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services

### 3. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights

#### 4. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”

#### 5. Rise of Factionalized Elites

#### 6. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors <sup>45</sup>

It is important to note that the Fund for Peace study does not use statistical data to determine a country as a failed state. The Fund for Peace utilizes a key word search on documents as the basis of their research for determining a nation’s status as failed or not failed. This methodology appears to be very accurate in determining failed states but does not assist in determining ungoverned space, since ungoverned space is largely dependent on the capabilities of the government to utilize the elements of national power to support its citizens. It is important to highlight that failed states are usually the best environments for the creation of ungoverned space. Therefore, if a country scores high according to both models, the assumption is that the external source validates the proposed model.

The evidence in the research data links some causality to becoming a failed state and potential ungoverned space based on the country’s ability to use the elements of national power. The experiment links several recognize failed states that possess an increased potential for ungoverned space due to the weakness of the government. The importance of the research is finding some key factors that contribute to a country’s genesis of ungoverned space. The design

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<sup>45</sup>The Fund for Peace, “The Twelve Indicators of CAST,” Available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindicators.php>; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2006.

of the experiment did work to finding relevant information regarding potential failed states and the creation of ungoverned space with a correlation to the Fund for Peace Study.

There was also significant correlation to the Fund for Peace study that listed the top 60 failed states. Seventeen of the countries depicted on Table 1 are one of the top 30 failed states by the Fund for Peace study. It is apparent that Somalia and Sudan are clearly recognized as failed states by most organizations.<sup>46</sup> The countries that appear with them on the data have a higher probability to create ungoverned space according to the parameters of the experiment. Somalia, since the fall of Siad Barre's government fifteen years ago, is the perfect example of ungoverned space and the perfect environment for terrorist organizations to operate.

Countries like Gabon and Namibia have potential to become failed states but currently rank well in national power. The United States must take advantage of these nations by assisting them to enhance their national power and their influence within the region. Focusing on nations that have the greatest potential for change will set the conditions for the United States to assist the weaker nations via multinational support with the stronger African nations.

The results show that the nations of Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa region, pose the greatest threat to creating ungoverned space. The current religious tensions in Sudan will increase the instability in the region and provide a greater opportunity for terrorist organizations to operate in the Horn of Africa region. The constructs of the experiment did provide data pertinent in the ability to determine a failed state. The experiment is a good starting point for

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<sup>46</sup>The Fund for Peace, "Failed States Index 2006," Available from <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php>; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2006.

determining ungoverned space. The elements of national power do not provide all the requirements to determine “ungoverned space,” The experiment requires some other variables to determine ungoverned space in the country. A possible addition would be the population density of the country since the less densely populated regions would provide a better idea of ungoverned space.

## **Diplomacy**

The most important findings from results on diplomacy is the significance of membership in international organizations and the presence of embassies abroad to enhance the productivity of a nation. If the United States State Department can assist the African nations to increase their representation abroad, then there should be an increase in the PPP for the country and an expected increase in the Gross Domestic Production. Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are two nations with a minimal amount of representation in international organizations and it is clearly reflected in their low ranking of GDP. If the United States increases their representation by even two embassies, it is possible that they will increase the GDP by 50 percent to be similar to Senegal with three embassies abroad. The diplomatic representation results with an increase in the diplomatic power and economic power. The increase in diplomatic power will allow the African nations to expand critical organizations such as the Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. The average membership in international organizations is forty-three for the African nations. If the United States can assist these nations to participate in a greater number of

international organizations, focusing on the key areas of economic growth, it is possible to try to reverse the current poverty trends within Africa. The current situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for minerals to support the cell phone business demonstrates the need to establish a new international organization to regulate the sale of these materials to ensure that the western world is not support brutal regime for the ease of cell phone communications.<sup>47</sup>

## **Information**

The results of the experiment showed a strong correlation to the phones and radio stations. If the United States military and State Department work on increasing the infrastructure of the African nations weak in these categories, the results should be significant for increasing the information flow across the region. The United States realize the significance of information operations during World War II and even more importantly during the Cold War. The United States must enhance the efforts within the African continent to provide information to the citizens of African nations. The United States must identify the countries that are the weakest across the information spectrum. Any country that lies below the average of 20 radio stations can benefit but focusing on the countries below ten radio stations gives a dramatic boost to countries, like Rwanda and Liberia, who are trying to overcome years of civil war. Due to the low literacy rates of African nations, the radio is still the best method of information flow to the citizens.

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<sup>47</sup>Kristi Essick, “Guns, Money, and Cell Phones,” *Industry Standard Magazine*, 11 June 2001, Available from <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa/Articles/TheStandardColtan.asp>; Internet; accessed on 2 January 2007.

The means of communication with the greatest increase over the next five years is the internet. The more effort placed on connecting the African nations to the world should result in a brighter future for the youth of Africa. Increasing the connections between the two cultures will establish the bonds needed to decrease the flow of hatred towards the United States. The United States presence in Africa is small and often not highlighted for the good conducted in the various nations. Increasing the flow of information on US actions within the region should assist the United States to regain lost soft power within the region.

## **Military**

The United States is currently expanding its military presence within the African continent with the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative. This practice should be expanded to include all of the African nations. The data demonstrates the strong significance of military size to the population and area of a country but much more important is the training of the military. The United States government can benefit from assisting African nations to enhance their military and expand the role into peacekeeping operations within Africa. Peacekeeping operations benefit the Host Nation in various ways. The first being a disciplined force that can deal with any internal conflict within the auspices of international law. The second is to be a force provider to assist other African nations. Several countries throughout the world are making an effort to create a peacekeeping force available for worldwide deployments. The rationale is to create a trained force for the peacekeeping mission but the units also reap the benefits of training dollars and equipment that would not have been available through traditional means. Chile is an excellent example of a country that is increasing the capabilities of their military by performing the peacekeeping mission. The Chilean soldiers benefit from an increase in pay why serving in a peacekeeping role. Once African nations realize the value of being peacekeeping force providers, the military will see an expansion and a rise in professionalism to meet the demand for

peacekeepers. The country will benefit for the increase in international trade and with the respect garnered from playing an important role in regional security.

## **Economic**

The economic strength of African nations is poor in comparison to other nations of the world. Forty-six of the Sub-Saharan nations borrow money from the World Bank bringing with the money the problems associated from non-state actors effecting government.<sup>48</sup> The greatest way to decrease ungoverned space in Africa is to work on resolving the economic crisis. It is impossible to spend money to improve security if the country does not have the GDP to fund such endeavors. The government inability to pay Soldiers increases problems when rogue commanders start to form militias and take actions against government forces.<sup>49</sup>

The Millennium Challenge Account is President Bush's answer to the current problem of economic disparity in the African region.<sup>50</sup> The goal of the account is to provide funds to impoverished nations and ensure that the funding reaches people rather than governmental leaders. The qualifiers for the funds are governing justly, investing in people, and promoting economic freedom.<sup>51</sup> The goals are admirable but often lead to worse situations for certain

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<sup>48</sup>William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 4.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>50</sup>The White House, The Millennium Challenge Account, Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html>; Internet; accessed on 10 December 2006.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

countries. The amount of funding authorized for the program is well below desired objectives with little chance of full funding with the democratic led Congress.<sup>52</sup>

The model demonstrates the need to focus the money into two programs that offer a greater success for economic improvement. The greatest factor on GDP for a country, according to the model, is the level of human capital that a country can provide. The results demonstrate a high correlation between human capital and GDP. The United States must focus its economic efforts to enhance the human capital in the targeted countries. The countries with large amounts of natural resources can benefit from an educated work force that can operate and manage the facilities. Countries in Africa that are oil producers at a minimum double their neighbors without such resources.<sup>53</sup> A contributing factor for this success economically is the fact that student enrollment is 50 percent higher in oil producing nations vice non-oil producing nations.<sup>54</sup> The representation of countries in international membership is similar in correlation but has a greater significance. The United States needs to focus on assisting struggling nations to gain membership in international organizations but particularly economic organizations. The cost to provide experts to assist the African Union nations to enter into the World Trade Organizations to receive preferential treatment are minor compared the cost of not doing it.<sup>55</sup> MERCOSUR success in

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<sup>52</sup>James W. Fox and Lex Rieffel, “The Millennium Challenge Account: Moving Toward Smarter Aid” (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 25 July 2005) available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/20050714rieffel.htm>; Internet; accessed on 26 December 2006)

<sup>53</sup>Robert Rotberg, When States Fail Causes and Consequences, 103.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid,

<sup>55</sup>William A. Aponsah, “African Regional Integration: A Pre-Condition Toward Multilateral Liberalization,” Paper prepared by the African Knowledge Network Forum, 11 October 2001, Available from [http://www.uneca.org/aknf/aknf2001/AKNF%202001\\_Ampsonsah\\_African%20Regional%20Integration.htm](http://www.uneca.org/aknf/aknf2001/AKNF%202001_Ampsonsah_African%20Regional%20Integration.htm); Internet; accessed on 29 December 2006.

South America is the best example for establishing an effective trade organization in Africa. The United States merely needs to provide the technical assistance to the target nation in order to facilitate the establishment of overseas trade.

## **Law Enforcement**

Law enforcement is becoming a more critical aspect of national power due to the current GWOT and the need for experienced investigators to assist the military in exploiting evidence gathered from raids on terrorist facilities. Most countries in Africa do not realize the value of maintaining a police force vice military forces conducting the police role. The fact that only fourteen countries out of the African region that have police data on Jane's Information website is a clear indication to the lack of effort by these countries to enforce state laws within their borders. The average police officer to area ratio in the fourteen African countries represented in the study is one officer to 61 miles of area or one officer for each 1,390 people. In the United States, the average for the entire nation is 2.3 sworn police officers for each 1,000 residents.<sup>56</sup> This number is even greater in large population areas.<sup>57</sup> The United States must utilize the expertise at the various law enforcement agencies to strengthen the local and national law enforcement of developing nations in order to prevent the creation of ungoverned space. The United States must implement a similar strategy to the current International Military Exchange Training but expand the scope to include enrollment of police officers in the various courses throughout the United

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<sup>56</sup>James T. Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp), Available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html>; Internet; accessed on 25 October 2006.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

States. A law enforcement exchange program creates several key benefits. This first is strengthening the ties between the United States and foreign police forces, which can pay dividends with the GWOT and the war on drugs. Secondly, the exchange of ideas between the two forces will only enhance the capabilities of law enforcement within the region of Africa and help establish the conditions to provide legitimacy to an honest police force. The last reason is to increase the soft power of the United States in the region by demonstrating on desire to help the citizens of a country by means other than military intervention.

In conclusion, the United Nations and the United States must start to work with these nations and focus resources to assist them. Dobbin's makes it clear that it is significantly cheaper in money and human life to conduct nation building rather than war, especially when the mission is multilateral.<sup>58</sup> The United States must adapt its foreign policy to multilateral nation building in order to avoid future-armed conflicts.

## RECOMMENDATION

The United States must embrace all the elements of national power to interact successfully with the nations of the world. Historically, the United States chooses to use military power too often and not the other elements of national power. China is currently the strongest user of soft power throughout the world, reaping the benefits economically and politically from this practice. It is vital that the United States regains the ability to project “soft power” throughout

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<sup>58</sup>James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role In Nation-Building From Germany To Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 165-166.

the world, especially in the African continent due to the infighting between the United States and China for natural resources. The United States demonstrated its ability to incorporate all the elements of national power after World War II with the Marshall Plan in Europe and the reconstruction of Japan. The United States established the importance of diplomacy and economic assistance to ensure the rapid reconstruction and creation of strategic allies. These alliances are dramatically easier to develop and maintain over time by diplomacy and economic assistance vice military threats or coercion. It is vital for the security of the United States to increase its involvement in developing a friendship with African nations by assisting them in economic advancement.

The recommendation for the Combatant Commander and the United States government is to focus resources and political capital to increase the stability in Nigeria and shaping efforts with the Gulf of Guinea nations. The purpose for the improved relations is to ensure the United States retains access to oil reserves in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea in the future. Nigeria provides 1.010 million barrels-per-day to the United States and collective with Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela provides 69 percent of the United States oil imports.<sup>59</sup> Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, in June of 2002, reported to the House International Relations Committee “Energy from Africa plays an increasingly important role in our energy security.”<sup>60</sup> The Gulf of

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<sup>59</sup>Energy Information Administration, *Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries*, Available from [http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil\\_gas/petroleum/data\\_publications/company\\_level\\_imports/current/import.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html); Internet; accessed on 16 February 2007.

<sup>60</sup>James Dao, “In Quietly Courting Africa, U.S. Likes the Dowry: Oil,” *New York Times*, 19 September 2002, Available from [http://www.spusa.org/pubs/health\\_med/aidsinafrica/aidsarticles/In%20Quietly%20Courting%20Africa.pdf](http://www.spusa.org/pubs/health_med/aidsinafrica/aidsarticles/In%20Quietly%20Courting%20Africa.pdf); Internet; accessed on 16 February 2007.

Guinea can provide at least 35 percent of the United States oil requirements by 2010 and even a greater percentage if the United States can bring an increased stability to the region.

In adhering to the objectives of national power, the best course of action for the United States is to find out the security needs for Nigeria and work to assist Nigeria to achieve the end state. Nigeria is a relatively strong nation according to the experiment parameters for national power creating easier conditions for improving its situation. The number one concern for Nigeria is establishing security for the citizens of Nigeria and oil infrastructure. The oil infrastructure is often considered ungoverned space due to the inability of the government to prevent attacks on facilities or the theft of oil.<sup>61</sup> These conditions provide the Combatant Commander with an excellent opportunity to assist Nigeria. The Nigeria's National Security vision is as for "a military sector with modernized equipment, well-trained in all aspects of military operation, fully professionalized, compact and mobile with adequate equipment, fire-power and communications, capable of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities and performing its international peace-keeping role proudly and efficiently is in place."<sup>62</sup> The United States military is qualified to execute the training and resourcing Nigeria requires to reach its end state. Mitigating the current threat of rebel activity provides an opening for the United States to establish stability in the region

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<sup>61</sup>Paul M. Lubeck, Michael J. Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz, "Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the 'Securing' of Nigerian Democracy," Center for International Policy (February 2007), Available from [http://www.ciponline.org/NIGERIA\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.ciponline.org/NIGERIA_FINAL.pdf); Internet; accessed on 16 February 2007.

<sup>62</sup>Nigeria Direct, National Security, Ministry of Defence, *Vision*, Available from [http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/national\\_security.aspx](http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/national_security.aspx); Internet; accessed on 16 February 2007.

while ensuring stability in oil prices. Rebel activity creates conditions for an increase in the cost per barrel both in Nigeria and worldwide.<sup>63</sup>

African Command (AFRICOM) is the correct solution for the problems in Nigeria and the region. AFRICOM must create programs similar to the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in South America by establishing regional security cooperation and build partnership with all African nations. The Nigerian Army can play a significant role in the security cooperation since Nigeria is a premier partner in African peacekeeping efforts. This provides an opportunity for the Nigerian Army to receive increased funding from the United Nations and to prepare soldiers for the peacekeeping role. More importantly, it provides the opportunity for the United States military to conduct Foreign Military Interaction in the form of Personnel Exchange Programs and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges; the cost of these programs is small and provides a face-to-face interaction between the two military forces establishing the foundation for future increases to military-to-military contact. The establishment of the AFRICOM budget will provide the AFRICOM Commander funding to support the interactions of senior officers in the form of an African Armies Conference, an Inter-African Naval Conference, and a System of Cooperation among African Air Forces all modeled after the SOUTHCOM programs. These programs not only enhance the capabilities of the Nigerian military but also provide the opportunity to shape the conditions for expanding the programs to the other Gulf of Guinea nations surrounding

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<sup>63</sup>Jim Landers, "African oil fields: Rewards and Risks," *Dallas Morning News*, 5 October 2004, Available from <http://www.energybulletin.net/2416.html>; Internet; accessed on 16 February 2007.

Nigeria. It provides Nigeria a key role in the security of the Gulf of Guinea by providing some defensive assets such as Coast Guard vessels and helicopters through foreign military sales.

Military interaction cannot be the only objective of the Combatant Commander. Nigeria and surrounding nations must enforce the rule of law. Historically, Africa's stereotype is corruption in government and business. To ensure the future success of African nations, the rule of law must be established and adhered to in order to attract foreign investment. The Combatant Commander can assist in this process by working with the Department of Defense and Department of State representatives to provide law enforcement experts in both police and judicial actions. The FBI initiated a plan in 1996 to double the number of FBI agents working in embassies as Legal Attaches.<sup>64</sup> The goal of the increase in staffing was to create a better cop-to-cop relationship with the Host Nation police forces.<sup>65</sup> The importance of law enforcement is even greater due to the rise of transnational threats since the GWOT. The United States can easily staff the required expertise to assist the Nigerian government to decrease the associated threats from criminals attacking oil infrastructure.

Simultaneous to these operations the diplomats must start working with the Nigerian government to find means to assist Nigerian on the path to economic recovery. Currently Nigeria reaps the rewards of high oil prices but unfortunately, the funds do not find their way to the majority of the citizens resulting in 75 percent of the country living at \$1 per day. The economic

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<sup>64</sup>Richard A. Best Jr., *Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2001), 12-13, Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL30252.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 16 February 2006.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

conditions only aid to the creation of criminals and the decrease in opportunities for other sectors of the economy to grow. Currently oil and petroleum products compose 95 percent of Nigeria's exports. It is essential for Nigeria to expand its economy in order to provide jobs and increase the quality of life for all its citizens. The United States possesses the technical expertise to assist the government to develop an oil revenue sharing program similar to Alaska or the more recent Iraqi proposal. This provides the opportunity for all Nigerians to benefit from the oil revenues and lead to a decrease in attacks on oil infrastructure.

The United States can work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to continue Nigeria's debt reduction and work for better terms on the interest rates. Despite the increase in oil profits Nigeria still struggles from external and internal debt that resulted from corrupt leadership. United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations must work with the government to improve their financial situation. If the United States can be successful with this operation, the goal would be to see an increase in the quality of life for the average Nigerian citizen that lives well below the poverty line. The most important effort in assisting Nigeria would be the creation of an Africa trade organization that would work similar to Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The African Union's mission is to improve the socio-economic situation for all African nations but a trade block similar to MERCOSUR would dramatically improve the economic strength for all member nations. The untapped resources in the Gulf of Guinea and the remainder of the continent provide a means to facilitate a new trading organization. Nigeria's possible withdrawal from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provides the catalyst for the creation of an African version of OPEC.

The United States must realize that it is more costly to use "Hard Power" than "Soft Power" to achieve the objectives. The recommendations listed above incorporate all the elements of national power to achieve the strategic aims of the United States. The Administration must adhere to Sun Tzu's principle "Keep your friends close and your enemies closer" to be successful with the nations of the world that provide ungoverned space to harbor terrorists. Ostracizing the

world by acting unilaterally instead of multilaterally creates a condition where nations must balance against the United States to maintain security. Africa unfortunately remained outside the strategic operational environment for far too long. This failure to assist Africa shaped the conditions for the creation of ungoverned space and the chaos that comes with it. The United States must work fast and efficiently to reverse this failure to ingratiate the African nations since the future of the United States is tied to Africa petroleum supplies.

## APPENDIX A




Figure 1. Ratio of Embassies to Population Density

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Embassyworld.com, available at <http://www.embassyworld.com/> accessed 20

September 2006




Figure 2. Ratio Embassies to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Embassyworld.com, available at <http://www.embassyworld.com/> accessed 20

September 2006




Figure 3. International Memberships to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 4. International Memberships to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 5. Land Line Telephones to Population

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 6. Land Line Telephones to Population (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 7. Cell Phones to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 8. Cell Phones to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 9. AM Radio Stations to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 10. AM Radio Stations to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 11. FM Radio Stations to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 12. FM Radio Stations to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 13. Shortwave Radios to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 14. Shortwave Radios to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 15. Television Stations to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 16. Television Stations to Population Density (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 17. Internet Hosts to Population density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 18. Internet Hosts to Population Density (Outliers removed)

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 19. Military Size to Population Density

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 20. Military Spending to Population Density

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Facts on International Relations and Security Trends and the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute available at <http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2> accessed 15

August 2006




Figure 21. Country Area Size to Military Size

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Jane's Information Group, Sentinel Security Assessment, available at

<http://www2.janes.com/K2/blvl1.jsp?Category=Countries> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 22. Military GDP Percentage to Military Size

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Jane's Information Group, Sentinel Security Assessment, available at

<http://www2.janes.com/K2/blvl1.jsp?Category=Countries> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 23. Human Capital to Country GDP

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, "[International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications](#)" (CID Working Paper No. 42, April 2000) - HUMAN CAPITAL  
 UPDATED FILES data tables available at  
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/Appendix%20Data%20Tables.xls> accessed 15 August 2006




Figure 24. Literacy Rate Percentage to GDP

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 25. Population Density to Size of Police Force  
*Sources:* The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Jane's Information Group, Sentinel Security Assessment, available at

<http://www2.janes.com/K2/blvl1.jsp?Category=Countries> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 26. Area Size to Size of Police Force

Sources: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Jane's Information Group, Sentinel Security Assessment, available at

<http://www2.janes.com/K2/blvl1.jsp?Category=Countries> accessed 15 December 2006

## APPENDIX B

Table 2. Diplomacy Paired Samples T Test Statistics

### Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
1	pop	2E+007	42	24259420.345	3743310
Pair 2	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
2	members	45.8810	42	6.04133	.93220
Pair 3	pop	2E+007	44	23886616.662	3601043
3	members	45.6591	44	6.08446	.91727
Pair 4	embassy	11.31	42	12.027	1.856
5	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
Pair 5	embassy	10.84	44	11.946	1.801
6	pop	2E+007	44	23886616.662	3601043
Pair 6	embassy	10.84	44	11.946	1.801
7	members	45.6591	44	6.08446	.91727
Pair 7	gdp	3006.8182	44	7455.99174	1124.033
	members	45.6591	44	6.08446	.91727

### Paired Samples Correlations

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	PPP & pop	42	.859	.000
Pair 2	PPP & members	42	.527	.000
Pair 3	pop & members	44	.497	.001
Pair 4	embassy & PPP	42	.452	.003
Pair 5	embassy & pop	44	.317	.036
Pair 6	embassy & members	44	.193	.210
Pair 7	gdp & members	44	-.269	.077

### Paired Samples Test

	Paired Differences						t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference								
				Lower	Upper							
Pair 1	PPP - pop	-2E+007	24259396.46	3743306	-2E+007	-9040554	-4.435	41	.000			
Pair 2	PPP - members	-26.20600	25.15878	3.88208	-34.04603	-18.36597	-6.750	41	.000			
Pair 3	pop - members	2E+007	23886613.64	3601042	8679952	2E+007	4.427	43	.000			
Pair 4	embassy - PPP	-8.36543	24.81077	3.82838	-16.09701	-.63385	-2.185	41	.035			
Pair 5	embassy - pop	-2E+007	23886612.873	3601042	-2E+007	-8679987	-4.427	43	.000			
Pair 6	embassy - members	-34.81818	12.31613	1.85673	-38.56263	-31.07374	-18.752	43	.000			
Pair 7	gdp - members	2961.159	7457.63374	1124.281	693.83120	5228.487	2.634	43	.012			

Table 3. Diplomatic Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA tables

		Model Description
Model Name		MOD_1
Dependent Variable	1	PPP
	2	gdp
	3	embassy
	4	members
Equation	1	Linear
Independent Variable		pop
Constant		Included
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots		Country

**Case Processing Summary**

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	3
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

**Variable Processing Summary**

	Variables				
	Dependent				Independent
	PPP	gdp	embassy	members	pop
Number of Positive Values	42	44	41	44	44
Number of Zeros	0	0	3	0	0
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Missing Values	User-Missing	0	0	0	0
	System-Missing	3	1	1	1

## Purchasing Power Parity Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.859	.737	.731	14.431

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	23383.654	1	23383.654	112.279	.000
Residual	8330.584	40	208.265		
Total	31714.238	41			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	9.84E-007	.000	.859	10.596	.000
(Constant)	3.333	2.709		1.231	.226




Figure 27. Purchasing Power Parity versus Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 28. Purchasing Power Parity versus Population Density (Outliers Removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

### Gross Domestic Product Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.231	.054	.030	1621.151

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	5950975	1	5950975.431	2.264	.140
Residual	1.1E+008	40	2628130.376		
Total	1.1E+008	41			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	-1.6E-005	.000	-.231	-1.505	.140
(Constant)	2184.508	304.285		7.179	.000




Figure 29. Gross Domestic Product versus Population  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006




Figure 30. Gross Domestic Product versus Population (Outliers removed)  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

### Embassies Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.301	.091	.068	11.611

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	538.024	1	538.024	3.991	.053
Residual	5392.952	40	134.824		
Total	5930.976	41			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	1.49E-007	.000	.301	1.998	.053
(Constant)	8.831	2.179		4.052	.000

### Membership in International Organizations Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.492	.242	.223	5.326

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	361.897	1	361.897	12.760	.001
Residual	1134.508	40	28.363		
Total	1496.405	41			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	1.22E-007	.000	.492	3.572	.001
(Constant)	43.848	1.000		43.865	.000

Table 4. Information Paired T-Test

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	pop phones	2E+007 136811.0	44	23886616.662 242327.4928	3601043 36532.24
Pair 2	pop cells	2E+007 1245514	44	23886616.662 3276628.505	3601043 493970.3
Pair 3	pop am	2E+007 6.2727	44	23886616.662 13.16684	3601043 1.98498
Pair 4	pop fm	2E+007 11.0000	44	23886616.662 11.23119	3601043 1.69316
Pair 5	pop shortwav	2E+007 2.7955	44	23886616.662 2.50190	3601043 .37718
Pair 6	pop tvstat	2E+007 3.4091	44	23886616.662 3.89584	3601043 .58732
Pair 7	pop internet	2E+007 1414.2955	44	23886616.662 2552.69653	3601043 384.83348

**Paired Samples Correlations**

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	pop & phones	44	.857	.000
Pair 2	pop & cells	44	.829	.000
Pair 3	pop & am	44	.791	.000
Pair 4	pop & fm	44	.313	.038
Pair 5	pop & shortwav	44	.422	.004
Pair 6	pop & tvstat	44	.070	.650
Pair 7	pop & internet	44	.176	.254

**Paired Samples Test**

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)			
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference							
					Lower	Upper						
Pair 1	pop - phones	2E+007 23679185.63	3569772 8606250	2E+007 2E+007	4.428	43	.000					
Pair 2	pop - cells	1E+007 21251028.94	3203713 8235774	2E+007 2E+007	4.587	43	.000					
Pair 3	pop - am	2E+007 23886606.25	3601041 8679993	2E+007 2E+007	4.427	43	.000					
Pair 4	pop - fm	2E+007 23886613.14	3601042 8679987	2E+007 2E+007	4.427	43	.000					
Pair 5	pop - shortwav	2E+007 23886615.60	3601043 8679994	2E+007 2E+007	4.427	43	.000					
Pair 6	pop - tvstat	2E+007 23886616.39	3601043 8679993	2E+007 2E+007	4.427	43	.000					
Pair 7	pop - internet	2E+007 23886167.99	3600975 8678719	2E+007 2E+007	4.427	43	.000					

Table 5. Information Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA tables

		Model Description
Model Name		MOD_2
Dependent Variable	1	phones
	2	cells
	3	am
	4	fm
	5	shortwav
	6	tvstat
	7	internet
Equation	1	Linear
Independent Variable		pop
Constant		Included
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots		Country

#### Case Processing Summary

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	1
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

#### Variable Processing Summary

	Variables							
	Dependent							Independent
	phones	cells	am	fm	shortwav	tvstat	internet	pop
Number of Positive Values	44	44	37	42	40	42	44	44
Number of Zeros	0	0	7	2	4	2	0	0
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Number of Missing Values	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
User-Missing Values	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
System-Missing								

## Land Line Phones Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.857	.735	.729	126210.230

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.9E+012	1	1.856E+012	116.520	.000
Residual	6.7E+011	42	1.593E+010		
Total	2.5E+012	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	.009	.001	.857	10.794	.000
(Constant)	-1849.978	22957.181		-.081	.936

## Cell Phone Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.829	.687	.679	1856241.728

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	3.2E+014	1	3.169E+014	91.984	.000
Residual	1.4E+014	42	3.446E+012		
Total	4.6E+014	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	.114	.012	.829	9.591	.000
(Constant)	-566453	337643.6		-1.678	.101

### AM Radio Stations Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.791	.625	.616	8.155

The independent variable is pop.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	4661.522	1	4661.522	70.093	.000
Residual	2793.205	42	66.505		
Total	7454.727	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	4.36E-007	.000	.791	8.372	.000
(Constant)	-.676	1.483		-.456	.651

## FM Radio Stations Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.313	.098	.077	10.793

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	531.790	1	531.790	4.565	.038
Residual	4892.210	42	116.481		
Total	5424.000	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	1.47E-007	.000	.313	2.137	.038
(Constant)	8.653	1.963		4.408	.000

## Shortwave Radio Stations Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.422	.178	.159	2.294

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	48.041	1	48.041	9.125	.004
Residual	221.118	42	5.265		
Total	269.159	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	4.43E-008	.000	.422	3.021	.004
(Constant)	2.090	.417		5.008	.000

### Television Stations Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.070	.005	-.019	3.932

The independent variable is pop.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	3.235	1	3.235	.209	.650
Residual	649.402	42	15.462		
Total	652.636	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	1.15E-008	.000	.070	.457	.650
(Constant)	3.226	.715		4.510	.000

Table 6. Military Paired T-Test

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	milsize	27272.73	44	42392.601	6390.925
1	pop	2E+007	44	23886616.662	3601043
Pair 2	pop	2E+007	44	23886616.662	3601043
2	mil\$	168.0930	44	318.83916	48.06681
Pair 3	milsize	27272.73	44	42392.601	6390.925
3	area	511696.0	44	592190.03957	89276.01
Pair 4	pop	2E+007	44	23886616.662	3601043
4	area	511696.0	44	592190.03957	89276.01
Pair 5	milsize	27272.73	44	42392.601	6390.925
5	milgdp	2.789	44	2.9925	.4511

**Paired Samples Correlations**

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	milsize & pop	44	.468	.001
Pair 2	pop & mil\$	44	.318	.035
Pair 3	milsize & area	44	.385	.010
Pair 4	pop & area	44	.503	.001
Pair 5	milsize & milgdp	44	.635	.000

**Paired Samples Test**

	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference							
				Lower	Upper						
Pair 1	milsize - pop	-2E+007	23866800.506	3598056	-2E+007	-8658748	-4.423	.000			
Pair 2	pop - mil\$	2E+007	23886515.21	3601028	8679859	2E+007	4.427	.000			
Pair 3	milsize - area	-484423	577200.08497	87016.19	-659908	-308938	-5.567	.000			
Pair 4	pop - area	2E+007	23594584.48	3557017	8257086	2E+007	4.338	.000			
Pair 5	milsize - milgdp	27269.94	42390.7021	6390.6388	14381.99	40157.89	4.267	.000			

Table 7. Military Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA

**Model Description**

Model Name	MOD_1
Dependent Variable	1 2 3
Equation	1
Independent Variable	
Constant	
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots	milsize mil\$ area Linear pop Included Country

**Case Processing Summary**

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	1
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

**Variable Processing Summary**

	Variables			
	Dependent		Independent	
	milsize	mil\$	area	pop
Number of Positive Values	43	44	44	44
Number of Zeros	1	0	0	0
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0	0
Number of Missing Values	0	0	0	0
User-Missing Values	1	1	1	1
System-Missing				

## Military Size Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.468	.219	.201	37903.802

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.7E+010	1	1.694E+010	11.788	.001
Residual	6.0E+010	42	1436698170		
Total	7.7E+010	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
pop	.001	.000	.468	3.433	.001
(Constant)	14027.585	6894.563		2.035	.048

## Military Funding Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.318	.101	.080	305.844

The independent variable is pop.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	442600.8	1	442600.761	4.732	.035
Residual	3928711	42	93540.733		
Total	4371312	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	4.25E-006	.000	.318	2.175	.035
(Constant)	100.381	55.632		1.804	.078

### Area size of the Country Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.503	.253	.235	518046.128

The independent variable is pop.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	3.8E+012	1	3.808E+012	14.189	.001
Residual	1.1E+013	42	2.684E+011		
Total	1.5E+013	43			

The independent variable is pop.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
pop	.012	.003	.503	3.767	.001
(Constant)	313082.7	94230.703		3.323	.002




Figure 31. Country Area to Population Density

Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Table 8. Military Size Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA

**Model Description**

Model Name	MOD_2	
Dependent Variable	1	area
	2	milgdp
Equation	1	Linear
Independent Variable		milsiz
Constant		Included
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots		Country

### Case Processing Summary

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	1
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

### Variable Processing Summary

	Variables		
	Dependent		Independent
	area	milgdp	milsize
Number of Positive Values	44	44	43
Number of Zeros	0	0	1
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0
Number of Missing Values	User-Missing 0	0	0
	System-Missing 1	1	1

### Area of the Country Compared to Military Size Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.385	.148	.128	553031.131

The independent variable is milsize.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	2.2E+012	1	2.234E+012	7.305	.010
Residual	1.3E+013	42	3.058E+011		
Total	1.5E+013	43			

The independent variable is milsize.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
milsize	5.377	1.989	.385	2.703	.010
(Constant)	365051.5	99472.524		3.670	.001

### Military Percentage of the GDP Compared to Military Size Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.635	.403	.388	2.340

The independent variable is milsize.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	155.050	1	155.050	28.312	.000
Residual	230.014	42	5.477		
Total	385.064	43			

The independent variable is milsize.

#### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
milsize	4.48E-005	.000	.635	5.321	.000
(Constant)	1.567	.421		3.723	.001

Table 9. Economic Paired T-Test

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
1	pop	2E+007	42	24259420.345	3743310
Pair 2	gdp	1781.4815	27	1374.50328	264.52328
2	humcap	2.7033	27	1.40945	.27125
Pair 3	gdp	3006.8182	44	7455.99174	1124.033
3	lit	60.5159	44	19.32540	2.91341
Pair 4	gdp	3006.8182	44	7455.99174	1124.033
4	members	45.6591	44	6.08446	.91727
Pair 5	embassy	11.31	42	12.027	1.856
5	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
Pair 6	PPP	19.6750	42	27.81219	4.29151
6	members	45.8810	42	6.04133	.93220

**Paired Samples Correlations**

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	PPP & pop	42	.859	.000
Pair 2	gdp & humcap	27	.354	.070
Pair 3	gdp & lit	44	.280	.066
Pair 4	gdp & members	44	-.269	.077
Pair 5	embassy & PPP	42	.452	.003
Pair 6	PPP & members	42	.527	.000

**Paired Samples Test**

	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference							
				Lower	Upper						
Pair 1	PPP - pop	-2E+007	24259396.46	3743306	-2E+007	-9040554	-4.435	.000			
Pair 2	gdp - humcap	1778.778	1374.00556	264.42749	1235.240	2322.317	6.727	.000			
Pair 3	gdp - lit	2946.302	7450.60969	1123.222	681.10989	5211.495	2.623	.012			
Pair 4	gdp - members	2961.159	7457.63374	1124.281	693.83120	5228.487	2.634	.012			
Pair 5	embassy - PPP	-8.36543	24.81077	3.82838	-16.09701	-.63385	-2.185	.035			
Pair 6	PPP - members	-26.20600	25.15878	3.88208	-34.04603	-18.36597	-6.750	.000			

Table 10. Economic Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA

		Model Description
Model Name		MOD_3
Dependent Variable	1	humcap
	2	lit
	3	members
Equation	1	Linear
Independent Variable		gdp
Constant		Included
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots		Country

**Case Processing Summary**

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	18
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

**Variable Processing Summary**

	Variables				
	Dependent			Independent	
	humcap	lit	members	gdp	
Number of Positive Values	27	44	44	44	
Number of Zeros	0	0	0	0	
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0	0	
Number of Missing Values	0	0	0	0	
User-Missing	0	0	0	0	
System-Missing	18	1	1	1	

## Human Capital Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.354	.125	.090	1.345

The independent variable is gdp.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	6.457	1	6.457	3.572	.070
Residual	45.193	25	1.808		
Total	51.651	26			

The independent variable is gdp.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
gdp	.000	.000	.354	1.890	.070
(Constant)	2.057	.429		4.800	.000

## Literacy Rate Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.444	.197	.165	17.833

The independent variable is gdp.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1952.199	1	1952.199	6.138	.020
Residual	7950.741	25	318.030		
Total	9902.940	26			

The independent variable is gdp.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
gdp	.006	.003	.444	2.478	.020
(Constant)	48.703	5.686		8.566	.000

### Membership Compared to GDP Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.097	.009	-.030	6.022

The independent variable is gdp.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	8.614	1	8.614	.238	.630
Residual	906.571	25	36.263		
Total	915.185	26			

The independent variable is gdp.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
gdp	.000	.001	-.097	-.487	.630
(Constant)	48.005	1.920		25.004	.000




Figure 32. International Memberships to Gross Domestic Product  
 Source: The World Factbook, United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 14 November

2006 available at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> accessed 15 December 2006

Table 11. Law Enforcement Paired T-Test

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	police area	16193.33	15	35047.386	9049.196
Pair 2	police pop	16193.33	15	35047.386	9049.196
		2E+007	15	32441239.677	8376292

### Paired Samples Correlations

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	police & area	15	.397	.143
Pair 2	police & pop	15	.989	.000

### Paired Samples Test

	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)			
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference							
				Lower	Upper						
Pair 1	police - area	-370382	391810.39246	101165.0	-587359	-153405	-3.661	14	.003		
Pair 2	police - pop	-2E+007	32406577.567	8367342	-4E+007	799495.7	-2.049	14	.060		

Table 12. Law Enforcement Regression Curve Estimation with ANOVA

### Model Description

Model Name	MOD_4
Dependent Variable	pop
	area
Equation	Linear
Independent Variable	police
Constant	Included
Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots	Country

### Case Processing Summary

	N
Total Cases	45
Excluded Cases <sup>a</sup>	30
Forecasted Cases	0
Newly Created Cases	0

a. Cases with a missing value in any variable are excluded from the analysis.

### Variable Processing Summary

	Variables		
	Dependent		Independent
	pop	area	police
Number of Positive Values	44	44	15
Number of Zeros	0	0	0
Number of Negative Values	0	0	0
Number of Missing Values	User-Missing Values	0	0
	System-Missing	1	30

### Population Regression

#### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.989	.978	.976	4975467.494

The independent variable is police.

#### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1.4E+016	1	1.441E+016	582.189	.000
Residual	3.2E+014	13	2.476E+013		
Total	1.5E+016	14			

The independent variable is police.

#### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
police	915.475	37.941	.989	24.129	.000
(Constant)	2338274	1424022		1.642	.125

### Area Compared to Police Size Regression

### Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.397	.158	.093	385165.670

The independent variable is police.

### ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	3.6E+011	1	3.610E+011	2.434	.143
Residual	1.9E+012	13	1.484E+011		
Total	2.3E+012	14			

The independent variable is police.

### Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Beta	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error			
police	4.582	2.937	.397	1.560	.143
(Constant)	312379.0	110237.7		2.834	.014

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